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We consider three plans for shifting the tax on corporate income to the personal level to achieve 
a significant reduction in the corporate tax rate. One plan eliminates the corporate tax and taxes 
dividends and the annual change in the value of publicly traded financial assets at ordinary 
rates. The second integrates corporate and shareholder taxes. The third lowers the corporate tax 
rate to 15 percent and taxes dividends and capital gains as ordinary income. To prevent large 
reductions in capital gains realizations and dividend payouts, an interest charge on taxes 
deferred during the holding period would be imposed when an asset is sold. We conclude that 
the third alternative is more robust than the other two. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 A high U.S. corporate tax rate is not sustainable as it creates strong incentives for income 
shifting and expatriation. Furthermore, the pressures on the high U.S. corporate rate continue to 
mount. For example, the United Kingdom corporate rate is scheduled to go down to 17 percent 
over the next five years. Many countries including the United Kingdom have introduced low tax 
“Patent Boxes” designed to attract research and development (R&D) activity and intangible 
income. In response, similar schemes have elicited great interest in the United States. An 
example is the discussion draft for a 10 percent “Innovation Box” introduced on July 29, 2015 by 
Charles Boustany (R-LA) and Richard Neal (D-MA), members of the House Ways and Means 
Committee. These types of proposals are necessarily complex and susceptible to significant 
abuse because a special category of corporate income is singled out for very favorable tax 
treatment. 
  These competitive pressures will continue even with a “traditional tax reform” that 
broadens the corporate tax base to finance a lower statutory rate. This type of reform of the 
current system finances only a relatively modest reduction in the corporate tax rate. Even the 
ambitious reform plans introduced in the Senate and House in recent years do not go lower than 
25 percent and they don’t appear to be fully revenue neutral. 
 Because of the limitations of base broadening and the compliance problems created by 
special subsidies for mobile income like patent boxes, several proposals have been presented for 
more dramatic reductions in the general corporate tax rate by shifting the burden of the tax on 
corporate income from the corporate to the individual shareholder level. These plans are intended 
to greatly reduce the benefits of income shifting and to equalize the advantages of foreign versus 
domestic corporate ownership and control. Indeed, as we will see, under some proposals, 
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acquisitions of a U.S. corporation by a foreign corporation would be at a tax disadvantage 
compared to acquisitions by a domestic company. 
 For purposes of this discussion, we assume that proposals have to be revenue neutral and 
that the burden of the tax on corporate income should generally be held constant. For example, in 
the case of shareholder credits for corporate taxes paid, we assume the credits are financed by a 
higher individual tax on dividends. Of course, no single individual taxpayer is necessarily made 
whole, especially since the tax positions of different holders of U.S. shares vary greatly. 
 One set of proposals is exemplified by Toder and Viard (2014), who propose eliminating 
the corporate tax entirely and marking publicly traded financial assets to market every year with 
any gain along with dividends taxed as ordinary income. Nontraded corporations would be taxed 
as pass-throughs similar to partnerships. An important feature of the Toder-Viard proposal is that 
capital gains on nontraded assets are taxed on a realization basis at preferential rates as under 
current law.  
 Another way of shifting the burden of the corporate tax to the personal level is integration 
under which the shareholder pays a much higher tax on dividends but receives credits for taxes 
paid at the corporate level. This has recently been suggested by Graetz (2014) as a way to deal 
with inversions and income shifting. The proposal is modeled after the Australian “franking” 
system under which the corporation can distribute franked dividends that carry a credit for 
corporate level taxes.
1
 But credits can only be given for taxes paid to the Australian government, 
as there is no pass through of foreign taxes paid. Furthermore, franked dividends cannot be 
issued by the foreign owner of inverted or expatriated corporations even if the local operating 
company pays substantial Australian tax. Australian law prohibits “dividend streaming” in which 
                                                 
1
 The Australian tax system has significant differences from the U.S. system. In particular, pension funds are taxed 
and can therefore use shareholder credits.  
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franked dividends are paid only to a certain class of taxpayers, but apparently companies can 
arrange their corporate structures to achieve the same result. We also look at a comprehensive 
integration plan proposed by the American Law Institute (ALI) under which the corporate tax is 
converted to a dividend withholding tax, in addition to other design changes, to see if it has an 
impact different from the Australian system. 
 We propose a third alternative that attempts to incorporate some of the desirable features 
of the other proposals without their shortcomings. It lowers the corporate tax rate to 15 percent, 
not zero. It finances this reduction by taxing all dividends and capital gains as ordinary income. 
By itself, this would lead to large behavioral responses. Taxpayers would defer the realization of 
capital gains. Dividend payouts would be reduced and the additional retentions converted into 
increases in stock values. Individuals would use corporations to accumulate passive income and 
recharacterize labor income as corporate income. To prevent these responses, when the asset is 
sold an interest charge is imposed on the deferred tax liabilities during the holding period. This 
tax treatment of realized gains is sometimes referred to as “retrospective taxation” and is related 
to the proposals by Vickrey (1939) and Auerbach (1991) for an interest charge to maintain 
neutrality between realizing a gain now versus continuing to hold the asset. However, our main 
focus is to prevent large behavioral responses — large reductions in capital gains realizations and 
dividend payouts compared to current law, the use of corporations to accumulate passive income, 
and tax avoidance in the form of labor income being disguised as corporate income. Unlike the 
mark-to-market proposal of Toder and Viard (2014), this alternative applies to the disposition of 
all assets, not just publicly traded financial assets, because tax is due only when the asset is sold.  
 There is a currently an interest charge regime in the Internal Revenue Code in the Passive 
Foreign Investment Company (PFIC) provisions. While the PFIC rules have some useful 
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mechanics that we adopt, the interest charge regime we propose has several significant 
simplifications. These relate to the pattern of annual gains assumed when an asset is sold, the 
interest rate used, and the tax rate that applies to the annual gains.  
 Finally, the interest charge regime in our proposal requires two backstop rules to prevent 
the charge from being avoided. One is a deemed realization including interest charges at death to 
keep the tax from being deferred indefinitely. The other is a limit on dividends in any year with 
the excess subject to the capital gains regime. The purpose is to prevent a huge dividend shortly 
before a sale to escape the accumulated interest charges. 
 It is important to note that a shift in the burden of taxation from the corporate to the 
personal level is not a simple transfer from the U.S. corporate tax base to the U.S. shareholder 
owners of the tax base. As we will see, about 25 percent of the U.S. corporate tax base is owned 
by foreign direct and portfolio investors and at least another 25 percent is owned by pension 
funds, 401(k) plans, and other tax exempt institutions or saving plans. An increased personal 
level tax on dividends and capital gains will not apply to them. On the other hand, the increased 
tax on dividends and capital gains paid by U.S. taxable individuals will in part fall on income 
earned abroad by U.S. companies and U.S. portfolio investors. The alternative proposals all have 
to address the various problems presented by this incomplete transition from the U.S. corporate 
income tax base to the income of taxpayers subject to the U.S. personal income tax.  
 For simplicity, in what follows we refer to our plan for lowering the corporate rate to 15 
percent, increasing the tax rates on dividends and capital gains to ordinary rates and imposing an 
interest charge upon realization on individual tax liabilities deferred during the holding period as 
the "interest charge" proposal. We conclude that the interest charge proposal has advantages over 
the other two approaches. The Australian type of “dividend franking” system is ineffective in 
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discouraging income shifting. At least 50 percent of the shareholders are not subject to personal 
taxes on dividends and are not affected by any potential denial of shareholder credits. 
Furthermore, about half of U.S. multinational (MNC) companies pay enough U.S. tax to grant 
full franking credits to their shareholders. They can continue to engage in the income shifting 
they do now. Furthermore, even for the companies who do not pay sufficient U.S. tax to finance 
enough shareholder credits, companies and shareholders can respond in order to weaken the 
impact of the rule. Companies can cut back on their dividends, letting shareholders take out more 
of their return in the form of lightly taxed capital gains. Taxable shareholders can sell their 
shares with insufficient credits to tax exempts in exchange for shares in companies with full 
credits.  
 Finally, it is true that the potential loss in credits may discourage inversions. But there are 
many tax exempt shareholders who would welcome the benefits of inversion. They can acquire 
shares from the relatively few shareholders disadvantaged. Also, there are many major 
companies that pay little or no dividends. In summary, dividends are too elastic to use as a 
vehicle for controlling cross-border transactions.  
 The interest charge proposal has almost all the benefits of the mark-to-market plan 
without several of its serious shortcomings. One disadvantage of the latter plan is the large 
differential between the tax on traded asset capital gains and the tax on non-traded asset gains. 
The latter continue to enjoy the opportunity for deferring the realization of gains and also the 
current law preferential rate on these gains when they are finally realized. Another problem is the 
difficulty in achieving revenue neutrality with complete elimination of the corporate tax. 
Moreover, eliminating the corporate tax will not eliminate problems of income measurement as 
long as the rest of the world still taxes corporate income. 
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section presents 
information regarding the ownership of the corporate income tax base. This is important to 
understanding both the revenue and behavioral consequences of the different proposals that 
would shift the burden of the tax on corporate income from corporations to individual 
shareholders. We evaluate the Toder-Viard mark-to-market plan in the third section, and 
consider integration proposals, both in the form of shareholder credits with dividend taxation or 
by converting the corporate tax to a dividend withholding tax, in the fourth section. We discuss 
our interest charge proposal (taxing corporate income at a 15 percent rate and dividends and 
capital gains as ordinary income with an interest charge on deferred liabilities) in the fifth 
section. We consider design issues, incentives to defer capital gains compared to current law, 
transition issues, revenue consequences, effectiveness in combating income shifting and 
inversions, other possible behavioral responses, and distributional properties. In the final section 
we offer some conclusions regarding the relative attractiveness of the three different proposals to 
move the burden of the tax on corporate income to the personal level.  
II. OWNERSHIP OF THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX BASE 
In examining the shift of the tax on corporate income from the corporate to the personal 
level, it is important to identify the recipients of corporate income in order to understand the 
revenue and behavioral consequences of the reform. Are corporate shareholders taxable 
individuals, foreign shareholders, pension funds, or other types of tax exempts? Furthermore, the 
relevant answer depends on the proposal under consideration. If the reform is an integration plan 
with shareholder credits limited to U.S. taxes paid, the key factor is the share of U.S. corporate 
income owned by taxable resident individuals. If individual taxes on capital gains and dividends 
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are increased, the relevant tax base should include income from individual holdings of foreign 
shares. 
 We review several estimates and supplement them with more recent information. 
Researchers have used several data sources. Auerbach (2006) and Rosenthal and Austin (2016) 
use the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds (FOF) data on the holdings of U.S. equities. Tax 
data can also be used to identify the holdings of 501(c)(3) organizations (tax exempts) and U.S. 
corporate taxes paid by foreign-controlled U.S. corporations. The data sources are somewhat 
different conceptually, as the value of holdings in the FOF data is different from that in the tax-
based data. For example a U.S. corporation may have valuable stock but little U.S. taxable 
income because most of its worldwide income is abroad. 
 In spite of the different sources and methodologies, the studies all come to a similar 
conclusion — that at most 50 percent, and probably much less, of U.S. equities are held by 
taxable U.S. individuals. As we will see, this is significant for evaluating the proposals studied. 
For example, a reduction in the U.S. corporate tax rate coupled with an increase in personal level 
taxes can potentially lose a great deal of revenue because foreign and tax exempt shareholders 
gain from the corporate rate cut but are not affected by the personal level tax increase on 
dividends and capital gains. 
 Auerbach (2006), using FOF data, reports that households owned 42 percent of the 
market value of domestic companies. But he listed mutual funds separately and did not attempt 
to trace the share of their assets that was held in taxable accounts. Rosenthal and Austin (2016) 
estimate both direct and indirect holdings of U.S. corporate stock. They calculate the amounts 
held by nonprofits, in IRAs, and by both defined benefit and defined contribution pension funds. 
They conclude that in 2014 taxable household accounts only held 24 percent of U.S. corporate 
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stock. This would be relevant for integration type plans where shareholder credits depend on 
U.S. corporate taxes paid. It is also useful in determining who benefits from a cut in U.S. 
corporate taxes. However, for proposals that include an increased tax on capital gains and 
dividends it would also be necessary to add U.S. resident holdings of foreign shares. Combining 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and Treasury data suggests that individual holdings of foreign 
shares are about 25 percent of their holding of U.S. shares.
2
 
 The estimates based on the FOF do not directly indicate who owns the U.S. corporate tax 
base. There is the problem of firm valuation versus tax paid to the U.S. Treasury referred to 
earlier. Furthermore, the FOF data do not seem to include investments by foreign-controlled 
companies in the United States and the taxes they pay. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data 
indicate that, in 2012, foreign-controlled U.S. corporations paid 16.9 percent of total corporate 
taxes paid after credits (Hobbs, 2015). Tax based data on portfolio investment are not available, 
but Bureau of Economic Analysis data on the U.S. international position indicate that portfolio 
investment is greater than direct investment. That suggests that foreigners own at least 25 percent 
of the U.S corporate tax base.  
 Finally, Gravelle and Marples (2015) compare dividends received by individuals reported 
by the IRS Statistics of Income with dividends paid in the National Income and Product 
Accounts. They conclude that only about 25 percent of dividends appear on personal returns, 
consistent with the Rosenthal and Austin (2016) estimate that 24 percent of U.S. corporate stock 
is held by taxable individuals. 
III. ACCRUAL OR MARK-TO-MARKET TAXATION OF PUBLICLY TRADED 
FINANCIAL ASSETS  
                                                 
2
 Refer to http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#iip for more information. 
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 Toder and Viard (2014) have proposed eliminating the corporate tax entirely and 
substituting the inclusion in the annual personal tax base of dividends, interest, and the change in 
the value of publicly traded financial assets, all taxed as ordinary income. Assets would have to 
be marked to market each year. Capital gains on assets not publicly traded would be taxed as 
under current law, that is, upon realization at much lower rates. Publicly traded foreign stocks 
held by U.S. residents would also be marked to market. 
 A zero corporate tax rate would certainly eliminate all corporate gains from shifting U.S. 
income abroad or expatriating. There would be no benefit to shifting or expatriating, and any 
attempt to do so would risk being liable for positive foreign taxes. The plan also appears to 
simplify the tax system because companies would not have to compute U.S. taxable income 
under the Toder-Viard plan. 
 But the Toder-Viard approach has some serious shortcomings. One is the large revenue 
shortfall due to the fact that the personal tax base differs greatly from the corporate tax base. As 
discussed in the prior section, less than half the U.S. corporate tax base is owned by taxable U.S. 
individual taxpayers subject to current taxation on their investment income. The remainder is 
owned by foreign investors, pension funds, 401(k) plans, IRAs, and 501(c)(3) institutions 
(nonprofits) such as foundations and university endowments. Foreign investors are subject to 
only modest withholding taxes on dividends and are not subject to U.S. taxation of capital gains. 
Pension funds and retirement accounts are not currently taxed on corporate income and 
distributions to beneficiaries are already taxed as ordinary income. 
 Another major problem is the large tax differential between traded and nontraded 
financial assets. Owners of shares in companies not publicly traded would have two major 
advantages. They would retain the opportunity to defer realizing capital gains and, when they 
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finally sell their shares, the gains would be taxed at a much lower rate. As a result, any assets in 
which expected capital gains are an important component of the total expected return would tend 
to shift to the nontraded sector. For example, Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) would be delayed, 
and many more companies would be taken private. 
 Toder and Viard (2014) recognize the problem of derivatives such as swaps on traded 
securities, and propose that they also be marked to market. The derivative may not be traded, 
however, which would require some valuation methodology. Some derivatives may be very 
complex involving interest rates and exchange rates as well as various types of securities. There 
would also be many line drawing issues on what constitutes a traded security. Many corporate 
bonds and preferred stocks are very thinly traded. 
 Furthermore the complete elimination of the corporate level tax amounts to a failure to 
exploit the market power of the United States in offering investments to foreigners. The optimal 
tax on foreign investment strikes a balance between the net marginal revenue collected and the 
benefits of additional capital in increasing the marginal product of workers. It is unlikely to be 
close to zero for a large country with unique intangibles like the United States. 
 Finally, it is unrealistic to believe that corporate taxable income would not have to be 
computed. Such a belief ignores the international environment that is the main motivation for the 
accrual proposal. Foreign countries will try to steal the U.S. tax base. For example, some major 
countries are of the opinion that all the income from the local sales by U.S. MNCs, including the 
return from U.S.-developed intangibles, belongs to them. There have to be international rules 
governing the division of income such as the Arms’ Length Principle. If there is a transfer 
pricing dispute between countries under current law and there is a tax treaty, the respective 
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revenue authorities enter into negotiation. If there is no corporate tax and no estimate of taxable 
income, how is the interest of the United States to be defended? 
 Toder and Viard (2016) have now revised their proposal. To get closer to revenue 
neutrality, they only cut the corporate rate to 15 percent. They also add shareholder integration 
and a tax on interest received by pension funds and tax exempts. Shareholder integration is 
discussed below. 
IV. SHAREHOLDER CREDITS WITH DIVIDENDS 
 One suggestion to discourage income shifting and expatriation is to provide credits to 
shareholders for U.S. taxes paid when they receive a dividend (Graetz, 2014; Graetz and Warren, 
2014). U.S. companies could distribute “franked” dividends carrying the shareholder credit to the 
extent that the corporate income financing the dividend was fully subject to U.S. tax. The 
proposed system is modeled after the Australian franking system in which only taxes paid to the 
Australian Treasury are eligible for credits. There is no pass through of taxes paid to foreign 
governments.  
 Furthermore, no franking credits can be issued by foreign companies even if they have 
Australian subsidiaries paying Australian tax. Australian law does not permit dividend 
“streaming” under which some shareholders receive franked dividend and others do not. 
Apparently, however, corporations can achieve the equivalent of streaming by restructuring into 
separate divisions, each with their own shares.
3
  
 Because shareholder credits will be expensive in terms of lost revenues, we assume that 
there will be a substantial increase in the tax on dividends, consistent with the goal of largely 
                                                 
3
 There would also have to be minimum holding periods to claim the credit. Otherwise a tax exempt institution could 
sell the stock to a taxable entity just before the dividend payment date. 
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maintaining the tax on corporate income. This means that shareholders that receive dividends not 
eligible for credits will have to pay much higher taxes.  
 If a company chooses to pay out all of its income, including foreign income, as dividends, 
and all of its shareholders are taxable resident individuals, it would have no reason to shift 
income or expatriate under an integration system with shareholder credits for corporate level 
taxes. Any reduction in U.S. tax would just be offset by lower shareholder credits. However, any 
departure from this extreme case would bring back the benefits of income shifting and 
expatriation. The opposite extreme is a company that never pays dividends while shareholders 
just infrequently sell part of their holdings and realize capital gains attributable, at least in part, to 
the retained earnings. Also, unlike in the mark-to-market proposal, the capital gains tax rate 
would have to remain substantially below normal personal rates to avoid large declines in 
realizations. For these shareholders, the benefits of income shifting and expatriation would 
remain the same as under current law.  
 In addition, as discussed earlier, more than 50 percent of the U.S. corporate tax base is 
owned by shareholders not currently subject to U.S. personal income taxation. These include 
foreign direct and portfolio investors, pension funds including IRAs and 401(k)s, and other tax 
exempts like 501(c)(3) institutions. They suffer no loss from receiving unfranked dividends and 
continue to benefit from income shifting and expatriations. This large group of shareholders, 
which is not affected directly by the franking scheme, creates the possibility of large clientele 
effects. For example, they could concentrate on companies that engage in a large degree of 
income shifting, while taxable individuals concentrate on companies with large domestic tax 
bases. Those not subject to the U.S. personal tax could continue to receive the dividends they 
13 
 
receive now with no added tax liability. Taxable individuals might also shift into any type of 
company that is currently a low dividend payer.  
 The presence of a very large group of actual and potential shareholders not subject to 
personal U.S. taxes also has important implications for stock prices, as shares of companies with 
few available credits because of income shifting will not sell at a discount due to any tax that 
personal shareholders will have to pay on possible future dividends. If a company that pays few 
U.S. taxes retains all of its income, the eventual taxable seller will be able to readily sell his 
shares to a nontaxable investor at virtually the same price as under current law. Even a taxable 
buyer would be willing to pay for the full value of the company’s assets including retained 
earnings because they would get a new basis at that value. The capital gain would be taxed at the 
current low tax rate. 
A. How Many MNCs Have Paid Enough U.S. Taxes to Provide Full Credits for Their 
Current Level of Dividends? 
 In order to further explore the incentives facing companies and individual taxpayers 
under shareholder credit plans, we looked at how many U.S. multinational companies paid 
enough U.S tax to give full credits for the dividends they distributed to their shareholders. 
Corporate Form 1120 returns were used to identify the amount of U.S. tax a MNC paid in 2012. 
The tax returns were then linked to the company’s financial data on COMPUSTAT to determine 
the amount of dividends paid in 2012.
4
 
 We then computed the maximum amount of dividends with full credits for corporate 
level tax that the company could distribute. If the amount of taxes paid is T and we assume that 
                                                 
4
 Linking COMPUSTAT with data from tax returns is not straightforward and may result in an underestimate of the 
amount of U.S. tax paid relative to dividends paid in COMPUSTAT. Consolidation rules are easier in financial 
accounting. It is more likely that we missed taxes on an unconsolidated tax return than dividends by an 
unconsolidated financial affiliate.  
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the U.S. corporate rate remains at 35 percent, the maximum amount of franked dividends is 
. Note that  is pre-tax U.S. taxable income. Shareholders can receive 
the after-tax amount as dividends. For each 65 cents of dividends, the taxpayer would get a 35 
cent credit which would first be added to income and then claimed as a credit against the final 
tax liability. This maximum amount of franked dividends that companies could pay was then 
compared to the amount they actually paid. 
 We found that companies with about half of MNC worldwide income paid dividends less 
than the maximum they could have, and about half paid more dividends than the maximum 
allowable amount. Therefore, the former group could continue to engage in and benefit from the 
income shifting they do now while also continuing to maintain their current level of dividends, 
 Consider the group of companies that pay more dividends than they can frank with the 
U.S. taxes they pay. Individual shareholders will have to pay very high tax rates on their 
unfranked dividends if the plan is revenue neutral.
5
 Companies and shareholders can respond in 
several ways. For example, companies could reduce income shifting. The net benefit to the 
company and its shareholders would be the saving of marginal shifting costs plus any foreign tax 
that had been paid on the income. For each dollar less abroad, U.S. taxable income increases by 
more than a dollar because of the lower shifting costs. If a dollar of less income abroad that had 
paid zero tax simply became a dollar of U.S. taxable income with potential credits, there would 
be no benefit to the company. (Initially companies had equated marginal shifting costs with the 
tax differential.) As shifting is reduced further, the benefit declines as marginal shifting costs 
decline. 
                                                 
5
 The lack of sufficient credits can be handled in different ways. We assume that each shareholder will receive a 
certain percentage of unfranked dividends. 
 T(1-0.35) / 0.35  T / 0.35
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 But the company can also respond by paying fewer dividends. This saves the increased 
tax that shareholders would have to pay on dividends without full credits. We assume that 
initially the company has optimized the choice between current dividends and future capital 
gains based on tax costs and shareholder preferences. The higher cost of dividends relative to 
capital gains will disrupt this balance. But as dividends continue to be reduced, there will be a 
cost in terms of a large departure from shareholder preferences. 
 Shareholders can also respond by shifting some of their holdings to the first group of 
companies, those with dividends less than the maximum allowable amount. They could trade 
with foreign or tax exempt shareholders who are not affected by the personal tax on dividends. If 
the stocks are relatively substitutable, there will not be much change in relative prices between 
the two groups of companies. But the switch becomes less beneficial as shareholders depart 
further from optimal diversification and their preferred stock positions. This suggests that there 
will be an internal solution with adjustments along all three margins — reduced dividends, less 
income shifting, and a switch in shareholder portfolios. 
 Summing up, an integration scheme that restricts shareholder credits to taxes paid to the 
United States is an ineffective instrument for addressing income shifting. Only a relatively small 
amount of shareholders benefit from less income shifting, but they can also benefit from lower 
dividend payouts and a switch to companies that have room to increase dividend payouts that 
carry full credits. Moreover, we have not even considered other possible reactions such as MNCs 
with little U.S. taxable income acquiring domestic companies with a large stock of potential 
shareholder credits. 
 If companies can stream franked and unfranked dividends to different types of 
shareholders using different types of stock, for example, integration is even less effective in 
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reducing income shifting. Taxable shareholders will concentrate on the shares with the franked 
dividends. The potential credits can be assigned to them and it is therefore more likely that they 
can receive full credits with their dividends. All types of shareholders can be content with the 
current level of shifting. 
B. Expatriations 
 If we return to the no streaming assumption, the integration proposal is more effective 
against expatriations than income shifting because all dividend recipients subject to the U.S. 
personal income tax will be affected. Any tax paid by the U.S. operation that is now owned by a 
foreign company can no longer be used to provide a dividend credit. Any dividends paid by the 
U.S. operating company would go first to the new foreign owner. The increase in the dividend 
tax before credits under the system would make the U.S. taxable shareholders substantially 
worse off.  
 Of course, companies and shareholders could respond to lessen the impact. Companies 
could reduce their payout rates and let shareholders earn more of their return in the form of 
accruing capital gains. These gains when realized would be subject to the still low capital gains 
tax rate. Indeed, the U.S. corporations that pay little or no dividends would continue to be 
candidates for inversion. (If the foreign company eventually starts to pay dividends as it matures, 
the shares could be transferred to U.S. tax exempts or pension funds.) Another possibility is that 
U.S. taxable shareholders realize the increase in the stock price attributable to the inversion tax 
saving by selling to foreign shareholders or tax exempts.
6
 As suggested earlier, because of the 
large number of actual and potential holders of the stock not subject to the personal U.S. tax, the 
                                                 
6
 We assume that there would be rules restricting taxable shareholders from engaging in a swap with a tax exempt 
that turns dividends into capital gains. There is a new provision in Section 871(m) subjecting dividend equivalent 
payments to foreigners to withholding taxes. Some cases may be difficult to enforce. An example would be a stock 
forward where the expected dividend is buried in the price of the forward. 
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price can be expected to reflect the full inversion gain with only a modest discount for the 
increased dividend taxes if held by a taxable U.S. person.  
 Beyond that, the loss of dividend credits as a result of a foreign acquisition may in some 
cases be contrary to the national interest. It may discourage a foreign acquirer that is a much 
more efficient user of the U.S. assets. The foreign-owned U.S. operation could end up paying 
more U.S. corporate taxes than it would in U.S. hands. But U.S. shareholders would prefer a less 
efficient U.S. acquirer.
7
  
 Finally, if different shares and streaming are possible, the impact of the integration 
proposal on inversion is much weaker. Taxable shareholders would receive dividends directly 
from the foreign-owned entity in the United States. Taxes paid to the U.S. Treasury could still be 
used to provide franked dividends. The incentives would remain much like the shifting 
incentives before the inversion. The analysis would only differ from the earlier shifting 
discussion if inversion reduced the cost of income shifting from the United States. The new 
foreign parent might be in a better position to strip income from the United States. That would be 
true in the case of interest stripping from the United States if no new interest stripping rules in 
Section 163(j) are enacted. Furthermore the foreign parent could shift income to low tax entities 
without being subject to the U.S. CFC rules. 
C. Foreign investment by U.S. MNCs 
 Denying shareholder credits for foreign taxes will have a large negative effect on 
outbound investment. It is the equivalent of achieving National Neutrality under a worldwide 
system where there is only a deduction for foreign tax, not a credit. This will particularly affect 
                                                 
7
 To be sure, the surviving merged company could be a U.S. corporation to preserve the credits. There may be tax or 
nontax reasons why that is not chosen. The foreign acquirer may not wish to subject existing operations to the U.S. 
CFC rules and a worldwide tax system. A successful foreign acquirer would have an incentive to shift additional 
income to reduce the U.S. tax that can no longer be used as credits.  
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investment in relatively high tax countries. Consider the case of a foreign investment producing 
100 in pretax income where there is also a domestic investment yielding 100. The tax rate in 
each country is 30 percent. The dividend tax rate is 50 percent before eligible shareholder 
credits. The foreign investment has after-tax income abroad of 70. When the 70 is distributed to 
U.S. shareholders, they have 35 remaining after the 50 percent tax with no credits. The domestic 
investment also has an after corporate tax income of 70. When this is distributed to shareholders, 
they receive a credit of 30 from the government to offset the corporate level tax. They gross up 
their income to 100 and pay 50 percent of it. Their after-tax income is 50.  
 Note that this is not the result in a dividend exemption regime combined with a classical 
dividend system. The 70 of foreign income would not be taxed at the corporate level in the 
United States. When the 70 is distributed to shareholders it would be subject to the same 
personal tax as the 70 of domestic dividends. 
D. The ALI Integration Proposal: Is it Fundamentally Different? 
Another integration variant was proposed in a report for the American Law Institute 
(ALI) by Warren (1993). Instead of shareholder credits based on franked dividends, the ALI 
proposal would convert the corporate tax to a dividend withholding tax (DWT) which can be 
used by the shareholder as a refundable credit. A dividend (grossed up) would be deductible 
from corporate taxable income with a withholding tax equal to the corporate tax rate. Any 
corporate tax paid by the corporation before the distribution, in a Taxes Paid Account (TPA), 
could be used as credits against the withholding tax. Thus if the corporation had not paid any 
U.S. tax, it would be liable for the dividend withholding tax. At the same time, the shareholder 
can credit the withholding tax against its personal liability. A single level of tax is the result.
8
  
                                                 
8
 Both integration versions assume that fully taxed income is distributed first when dividends are paid. 
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The ALI proposal is very comprehensive with features designed to reduce tax planning 
opportunities. The DWT would be set at the highest individual tax rate in the year of distribution, 
which would also be the corporate tax rate. Furthermore capital gains would be taxable as 
ordinary income.
9
 The ALI would also impose a tax on dividends and capital gains earned by 
pension funds, tax exempts, and foreigners, with the same withholding tax credits available to 
domestic taxable shareholders. Taxing all capital gains at ordinary rates is necessary because 
capital gains would otherwise be a way of realizing the value of accumulated earnings without 
the need for TPA credits.  
 The Australian and ALI systems differ in who bears the direct burden of inadequate 
credits. For example, the dividend deduction scheme affects foreign investors and tax exempts 
differently from shareholder credits even if they are not taxed. If a company shifts income and 
therefore can only issue unfranked dividends, the tax exempts are indifferent because they are 
not taxable. They still receive corporate income free of any tax. On the other hand, under the ALI 
proposal, if the company pays a dividend it would be liable for the withholding tax on dividends 
because it would have insufficient TPA to use as credits. The tax exempt would no longer 
receive corporate income in the form of dividends free from tax at any level. (We assume that the 
company cannot have different types of stock with dividends going only to one type.) 
 However, that just means that tax exempts and foreigners would have a strong preference 
for capital gains if they continue to be untaxed. In addition, the tabulations cited above indicated 
that companies earning about half of MNC income would have enough TPA to credit the 
withholding tax on their current level of dividends. Their income shifting would not be 
restrained. Beyond that, the importance of tax exempts and foreigners as shareholders would 
cause U.S. companies to limit their dividends.  
                                                 
9
 The report does not specify whether this applies to all capital gains or just corporate shares. 
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 The ALI report explains the importance of taxing capital gains earned by foreign 
investors and tax exempts in the case in which the U.S. corporation has adequate potential credits 
in its TPA. The foreign investor could sell the stock to a domestic investor at a price that reflects 
the full value of the TPA. The domestic investor could use the TPA to shield any dividends and 
in addition would have a high basis in the stock that could be used in a realization. The income 
would be completely free of tax. Similarly, if the company shifts income and has no TPA to 
distribute, the tax exempt shareholder could realize the full value of the retained earnings by 
selling. Even a taxable individual who bought the shares would be willing to pay the full price of 
the company’s assets. From the buyer’s point of view, the purchase would be like a de novo 
investment.  
 The taxes on tax exempts and foreign shareholders would reduce some of the clientele 
effects in the Australian shareholder credit system, but they would constitute major changes in 
the U.S. tax system, particularly in the taxation of capital gains.
10
 The ALI report recognizes the 
administrative problems in attempting to tax capital gains earned by foreign shareholders. It 
suggests the possible use of the procedures in the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act 
(FIRPTA), the only instance in which capital gains realized by nonresident foreigners are taxed 
by the United States. Under the FIRPTA rules the buyer has to withhold 15 percent of the gross 
sales value of the property interest. But the foreign seller has the opportunity to reduce the tax by 
filing a U.S. return showing the actual net gain and paying tax subject to normal progressive 
rates. Given the amount of portfolio investment in the U.S. shares, millions of foreign 
shareholders would have to file a U.S. return. FIRPTA in fact recognizes the problem by 
excluding publicly traded shares from the withholding requirements for holdings of 5 percent (10 
                                                 
10
 Dividends would not result in any net tax because any liability would be offset by credits. The shareholder gets a 
credit even if there is no TPA. 
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percent for REITS) or less of the property company. (Incidentally, the ALI proposal does not 
seem to explicitly address the taxation of foreign shares held by domestic portfolio investors. 
This would include shares in inverted companies.)  
 Other aspects of the ALI proposal may create problems. One is the high corporate rate, 
suggested to be equal to the top personal rate, which would make it greater than 40 percent if the 
current schedule applies. A growing company that prefers reinvesting earnings to continually 
raising equity would potentially be taxed at a very high rate. It may have a greater incentive to 
shift income than under current law. (The Constructive Dividend proposal discussed below could 
offset that problem but, as we will see, that may create other opportunities for income shifting 
companies and their shareholders.)  
 Taxing capital gains as ordinary income will also cause problems because of a large 
reform-induced reduction in realizations (the response the interest charge proposal is designed to 
prevent). The data cited below on revenue sources indicates that the U.S. Treasury receives much 
more revenue from capital gains than dividends. This would affect the ability of achieving the 
goal of revenue neutrality under each alternative. (Revenue neutrality was not an explicit 
requirement of the original ALI report.) If extra revenue from capital gains does not arise, the top 
personal rate would have to be very high. Two levels of tax are being converted to one level, so 
the top personal rate would have to be the sum of the current tax at both the corporate and 
personal levels. In fact, it would have to be somewhat greater, because at any given top rate the 
withholding tax and credit loses revenue because shareholders below the top rate would receive 
refunds. 
 Finally, even for taxable individuals, the strategy of income shifting combined with 
retention and eventual realization still dominates a strategy of no income shifting with annual 
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dividends and credits for U.S. taxes paid. For example, if the worldwide pre-tax return is 5 
percent, and the personal and corporate tax rates are both 40 percent as in the ALI proposal, the 
shifting plus retention and eventual sale alternative results in a 25 percent greater increase in 
wealth after 20 years. The difference would obviously be greater if there is a capital gains 
preference. The ALI proposals would permit a corporation to pay a constructive dividend, 
instead of a cash dividend, with a basis adjustment for the shareholder. A corporation could 
therefore make a constructive dividend up to its Taxes Paid Account, so that shareholders selling 
their shares after a period in which the company retained shifted income would not have to 
sacrifice credits for U.S. taxes that were actually paid. 
The various integration proposals were originally designed to address the double taxation 
of corporate distributions, not the problems of income shifting, inversions, patent boxes, and 
international tax competition. Indeed, the discussion in the ALI report of income that has not 
borne corporate tax only refers to tax preferences and whether they should be passed through to 
the shareholder. Attempting to reduce income shifting through the loss of shareholder credits 
under the Australian integration variant or the loss of withholding tax credits under the dividend 
deduction proposal is not a well targeted policy. It is ineffective in many cases but too harsh in 
others. These integration proposals were designed to solve the corporate double tax problem, 
which inevitably involves some new regime for dividends. But that is the source of their flaws in 
the present context because the distribution of dividends is at the discretion of companies and 
shareholders. Capital gains are an alternative way of obtaining the full value of retained earnings 
without the requirement that sufficient corporate level tax be paid. 
 Furthermore, using integration to discourage inversions requires that foreign investors be 
denied integration benefits. But that may subvert the initial goal of integration to reduce the cost 
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of capital in the corporate sector if foreigners are important investors. Indeed, under the ALI 
proposal, the tax rate on foreign investors would rise above its current level. 
 Dividends paid deduction plans are in substance equivalent to the ALI withholding tax, 
except that companies can claim a permanent reduction in tax on their financial accounts. But, as 
in the ALI proposal, the company is still responsible for paying the withholding tax. The after-
tax return to the shareholder is identical. 
E. Withholding Taxes on Interest? 
 Proposals for withholding taxes on interest payments are, as in the ALI proposal, 
frequently linked with integration to equalize the tax on debt and equity. But withholding on 
interest has several serious problems. There are many domestic and foreign issuers of highly 
substitutable debt. Imposing a withholding tax on some segments of this integrated market will 
lead to large portfolio reallocations. The main result will be an increase in funding costs for the 
sector affected without much reduction in the net interest rate received by investors. Another 
issue is how withholding applies to financial intermediaries. The gross withholding tax may far 
exceed the bank’s profit spread on the transaction. A separate issue is the treatment of interest (in 
dollars) received from a foreign payor.  
 Furthermore, even if the withholding tax on interest is feasible, it may have a negative 
impact on the U.S. economy through its effect on interest rates. Companies would reduce their 
supply of debt as they substitute equity for debt and cut back on investment because of increased 
borrowing costs. This issue was studied by Grubert and Mutti (1994) in the context of the 
Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) under which interest payments were not deductible 
(which is sometimes referred to as backwards integration). Using a CGE model they projected a 
large decline in the U.S. capital stock of about 5 percent because of the sensitivity of cross-
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border debt flows to interest rate differentials. In summary, interest withholding schemes are 
difficult to implement, and if they could be made to work they would harm the U.S. economy. 
F. The Graetz-Warren Integration Proposal in this Forum 
 The Graetz-Warren proposal (Graetz and Warren 2016) largely follows the ALI (Warren 
1993) dividend withholding tax scheme, without being specific about the parameters proposed 
by ALI. Their paper seems to disagree with a capital gains preference but is not explicit whether 
they are proposing a rate of 39.6 (plus 3.8) percent, the top personal rate, as recommended earlier 
by Professor Warren. They propose a tax on investment income received by tax exempts and 
pension funds to offset the revenue loss attributable to the dividend deduction. They do not 
specify whether that includes capital gains. Similarly, they propose a withholding tax on 
investment income earned by foreigners but do not mention capital gains and the problems of 
taxing them. The ALI report was very clear in showing the importance of taxing capital gains 
because they are a way of receiving corporate income without using up the Taxes Paid Account. 
 In support of their contention that integration will greatly reduce the incentives for 
income shifting, Graetz and Warren (2016) cite the paper by Amiram, Bauer, and Frank (2014). 
These authors evaluated the impact of the elimination of imputation systems by Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, and Norway as a result of rulings by the European Court of Justice, as well as 
the enhancement of imputation credits by Australia in 2002. They find a significant increase in 
tax avoidance in the European case and the opposite in the Australian case. But the effect seems 
to be concentrated in largely domestic companies. It is insignificant for multinationals, which is 
surprising in view of MNCs’ opportunities for tax avoidance. Their results may simply reflect 
accelerated R&D and depreciation deductions by domestic companies. Furthermore, any 
observation may not be very relevant for the United States because tax exempts like pension 
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funds and 501(c)(3)s are also probably less significant in these countries. For example, pension 
funds are taxed in Australia and benefit from imputation credits. Furthermore, the authors might 
have tried to identify the source of any impact more precisely. They do not use information on 
how close companies were to having their imputation credits limited by the taxes they paid. 
Another possibility would be to interact the initial level of dividend payouts with the imputation 
change variable. Low dividend payers would not have been significantly constrained. 
 Graetz and Warren (2016) recognize the problems of implementing a withholding tax on 
interest and the large portfolio reshuffling it can induce. However they seem to believe that 
restricting the deductibility of interest payments will not create these problems. The same tax 
payment goes to the government so the result would seem to be the same.  
V. TAXING CORPORATE INCOME AT A 15 PERCENT RATE AND DIVIDENDS AND 
CAPITAL GAINS AS ORDINARY INCOME WITH AN INTEREST CHARGE ON 
DEFERRED LIABILITIES 
As indicated in the introduction, we examine a proposal to shift the burden of the tax on 
corporate income to the personal level by lowering the corporate tax rate to 15 percent and taxing 
dividends and capital gains as ordinary income. In addition, an important aspect of the proposal 
is to impose an interest charge on the deferred tax liabilities on accruing capital gains when 
taxpayers realize their gains. This provision is designed to deal with the problems created by a 
personal tax rate on dividends and capital gains that is much higher than the corporate rate. 
Without the interest charge, companies would reduce their dividend payouts and shareholders 
would increase the holding periods for their investments before realizing gains. Evidence on the 
large effect of tax rates on capital gains realizations is very compelling (Dowd, McClelland, and 
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Muthitacharoen, 2015). Controlling shareholders in a closely held corporation would also 
attempt to recharacterize management income as corporate income taxed at much lower rates. 
 The higher tax rate and interest charge applies to all capital gains, not just gains from 
publicly traded shares, and includes assets such as real property, derivatives, carried interest, and 
collectibles. Unlike the Toder-Viard mark-to-market proposal, this approach does not create a 
large differential between the tax rate on publicly traded shares and other assets. There is no 
incentive to shift assets with high expected growth to the non-traded and non-corporate sectors. 
IPOs will not be delayed to preserve the opportunity for both deferring the tax on capital gains 
and enjoying the lower tax rate that would continue to apply to nontraded assets. 
 An interest charge on deferred tax liability has a precedent in the Internal Revenue Code 
in the form of the PFIC rules in sections 1291–1298. If a shareholder invests in a PFIC and does 
not elect either to mark to market or be in a Qualified Electing Fund (QEF), which annually 
reports the ordinary income and capital gains earned by the fund, the gain when the PFIC is 
liquidated is assumed to have accrued “ratably” over the holding period. The tax liability, at 
ordinary rates, imputed to each year carries an interest charge until realization. The final tax 
liability is the sum of the tax imputed in each year plus the cumulative interest charges until 
realization.  
 The PFIC rules have some useful mechanics that we incorporate. For example, all interest 
charges are for full years. We assume that the taxpayer paid the tax in the past on April 15 and 
that the final liability will be due on the April 15 after the year of the sale. But the interest charge 
proposal has several significant differences from PFIC, which seems to be a punitive regime 
designed to induce taxpayers to elect a QEF or the mark-to-market alternative. The PFIC interest 
regime specifies a “ratable” or constant absolute gain spread over the holding period, while we 
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prefer an equal compound rate of return assumption, which is fairer to the taxpayer. PFIC also 
specifies that the relevant tax applied to yearly gains plus interest is the top marginal rate in that 
year. In contrast, the interest charge proposed here just adds the gain plus interest charges to the 
taxpayer’s taxable income in the year of disposition. Also, the PFIC interest charge is the general 
penalty rate for underpayment of tax liabilities. In contrast, the basic rule for the interest rate in 
the proposal is to make the shift in the burden of taxation create no greater overall incentives to 
defer realization, limit dividends, recharacterize wage income as corporate income, or 
accumulate passive income in a corporation than current law. 
 The tax liability on the transaction depends on the actual capital gain, the holding period, 
the interest charges, and the individual’s tax rate. It is therefore different from the Auerbach 
(1991) solution which does not depend on the actual gain, but only on the final sales price, the 
holding period, and the interest rate. The interest charge is therefore not strictly Vickrey-
Auerbach optimal in maintaining neutrality between realizing a gain and deferring the sale for 
another period but, as explained above, that is not strictly the goal of our system. Because of 
fairness or distributional considerations, it is difficult to avoid making the tax liability depend on 
the actual gain. As we will see, the interest charge on the final gain not only reduces the 
incentive to defer capital gains realizations, but also to limit dividends, to recharacterize wage 
income as corporate income, and to accumulate passive income in the corporation.  
A. Taxing Gains at Death and Maximum Distribution Rules 
Because the interest charge accumulates as the holding period progresses, two obvious 
backstop provisions are necessary. One is that there is a deemed capital gains realization at death 
and the tax liability includes the interest charge accumulated over the holding period. This also 
applies when appreciated assets are given to another individual. It should not be possible to 
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escape the interest charge by continuing to defer realizing gains indefinitely.
11
 A similar proposal 
without an interest charge was in the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget (Office of 
Management and Budget (2015). 
 It should also not be possible for a corporation to pay a large dividend far in excess of 
current income to reduce the expected capital gain and associated interest charges just before the 
shareholder contemplates a sale. There thus has to be a maximum allowable distribution in any 
period. Anything above the threshold is subject to the interest charge over the holding period. If a 
dividend does not exceed current earnings it cannot be interpreted as reflecting any deferral of 
payouts. There is in fact an excess distribution rule under the current PFIC rules — 125 percent 
of the average amount of dividends received in the previous three years. A limit based on recent 
profits per share would be conceptually superior but it might be more difficult for the 
shareholder to obtain that information.  
B. A Mark-to-Market Option? 
 Taxpayers could elect a mark-to-market option for their publicly traded securities (such 
as is available now in PFIC). The election presumably would be irrevocable or could only be 
changed with the permission of the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury. Furthermore, all publicly 
traded securities the taxpayer holds would have to be included in the election.  
  Shareholders might make the mark-to-market election if their shares have been relatively 
flat for a long period of time. They could thereby avoid large interest charges going back over 
the whole holding period if they experience a large gain in the future. Another possibility would 
be to make mark-to-market mandatory for publicly traded securities, although it would 
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 It would of course be possible to continue accumulating interest charges through the generations but that would 
create severe compliance problems, such as establishing the initial basis. 
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exacerbate the line drawing issues referred to above. However, it would simplify the system 
because the interest charge would apply only to nontraded assets. 
C. Design Issues 
 Our interest charge proposal faces a number of design issues. 
1. The Tax Rate 
The tax rate applied to accumulating gains would have to be determined. Possible options 
include the top marginal rate in each year as in PFIC, the individual’s own tax rate in each year, 
or the individual’s final tax rate when the asset is sold. For simplicity, we would choose the 
taxpayer’s final marginal tax rate. As discussed below, this would then make it feasible for the 
IRS to publish a table each year showing how the markup on the capital gain realized in that year 
depends on the holding period and the percentage gain over the original basis. The resulting 
adjusted capital gain could just be added to taxable income subject to the normal schedule. 
2. The Interest Rate 
Under the present PFIC rules, the interest rate used for the interest charge is the U.S. 
Treasury average short-term rate plus 3 percentage points for individuals and 2 percentage points 
for corporations, which are the rates for underpayments. The short-term rate is the average yield 
on U.S. Treasury securities with a remaining maturity date of less than three years. In contrast to 
the penalty rate for underpayments under PFIC, the Vickrey-Auerbach theory specifies the 
interest rate should be the after-tax risk-free rate. As indicated earlier, the interest rate in the 
current proposal would be chosen to keep holding periods and earnings retention rates no greater 
than under current law. It should also deter individuals from using corporations to hold passive 
assets or recharacterize labor income as corporate income.  
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 There are thus four margins that the interest charge is intended to affect: (1) the capital 
gains realization decision; (2) the dividend payout decision; (3) the decision to accumulate 
passive income in a corporation; (4) and the decision to recharacterize wage income as corporate 
income. (These may be related, e.g., retaining income and investing in passive assets.) Any 
decision along any margin will be reflected in the final gain at the end of the holding period. The 
decision to establish a corporation to accumulate passive income is somewhat different from the 
other three decisions in that it deals with after-personal-tax income. Deferring dividends, 
deferring realizations, and recharacterizing wage income as corporate income all involve pre-
personal-tax income. 
 The gain from incorporating a “cash box” with after-tax income depends on the 
difference between personal and corporate tax rates, and would require a lower interest charge. 
The 15 percent corporate level tax plus the interest charge on deferred liabilities should be at 
least as great as the tax on the associated passive income if held directly. The common interest 
charge chosen must therefore be a compromise. It should be designed to prevent any increase in 
the overall revenue loss from behavioral changes, although there may be gains or losses from 
specific behaviors. Because deferring dividends and gains realizations are probably the most 
important margins, they will dominate the interest rate choice. 
 The choice of interest rate will be based on observed behavior. Existing studies on the 
response of realizations to changes in tax rates would give an indication of the return from 
holding versus selling and reinvesting. Similarly, any changes in realizations in response to 
market interest rates would indicate how the interest charge should be adjusted over time. 
Shareholders may vary in their responses because of different tastes and positions. The common 
interest charge would be designed to keep aggregate revenue at the overall “static” target. 
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 Another question regarding the choice of the interest rate is how it should change if the 
interest rate varies over the holding period. Should the interest charge be the one that applies for 
each year or the interest rate in the year of the sale? Using the latter would be the simplest 
option. If the IRS were to publish a table, it could average the annual interest rates for each 
holding period for the purpose of imputing the interest charge. It could even apply the relevant 
interest rate for each year in the holding period. 
3. The Treatment of Losses 
If the taxpayer sells an asset at a loss, it would seem symmetric to apply an interest 
component to the loss assigned to each year of the holding period. These losses could offset 
gains with carryovers as in current law. Since gains are taxed as ordinary income, it would be 
appropriate to relax the limitation on the extent to which capital losses can offset other income. 
4. Ratable Even Gains Versus Equal Compound Rate of Return Over the Holding 
Period 
Even gains put more of overall gains earlier in the holding period where they get a larger 
interest charge. For example, consider a 100 percent gain over ten years. In linear even gains, the 
return imputed to the first year is 10 percent versus 7.2 percent assuming equal annual rates of 
return. 
5. Deductibility of the Interest Charge 
Some taxpayers have objected to the non-deductibility of the interest charge under PFIC. 
But as discussed earlier, the interest charge would be chosen to keep the incentive to defer 
realizations no greater than current law. If the interest charge is deductible that would require a 
higher interest rate. Under Vickrey-Auerbach theory, the after-tax risk-free return is applied on 
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the grounds that it corresponds to the return the taxpayer would have expected to earn if s/he sold 
the asset and reinvested the proceeds. 
6. Transition 
The treatment of holding periods that begin before the effective must be determined. One 
clear possibility is to spread the gain over the holding period but only impute interest to the 
estimated tax liability after the effective date. The gains before the effective date would be 
subject to the lower pre-effective date tax rate. That would still reduce the incentive to defer 
realizations compared to present law. Of course this might not be a major problem because 
taxpayers would try to realize any actual gains before the effective date to have them taxed under 
the much lower capital gains tax rate. 
D. Compliance Issues 
1. Taxing Foreign and Domestic Mutual Funds  
In applying the interest charge to accrued gains, the shareholder's holding period is 
relevant, rather than the fund’s holding period. Whether any dividend derives from a capital gain 
in the fund or from current earnings is irrelevant. If the dividend exceeds the maximum 
allowable distribution, the excess is subject to the interest charge. If any gain realized by the fund 
is not distributed to taxpayers, it increases the value of the fund and is eventually subject to the 
interest charge when liquidated — similar to the mechanics of the PFIC. 
2. Sales and Dividends 
An interest charge applies when a realization occurs under the current rules. For the 
purposes of the excess dividend provision, a dividend occurs when a payment other than debt 
repayment reduces the potentially taxable gain in the stock. Thus, selling an option against a long 
position in an appreciated stock holding is not a dividend because Earnings and Profits are not 
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reduced. A sale occurs if the option is exercised. But a transaction that swaps a dividend for an 
interest payment is obviously a dividend. Accordingly, the provisions on dividend equivalent 
payments in Section 871(m) would apply. A buyback of stock would be a sale, not a dividend 
equivalent even if financed with retained earnings because the aggregate gain in the stock is 
preserved.  
E. An Annual Table to Help Taxpayers Apply the Interest Charge 
The interest charge under the current PFIC rules is very complicated. It specifies the top 
marginal rate in each year of the holding period, which could vary. The applicable interest could 
vary as well. We would simplify matters by assuming that the individual’s tax rate in the year of 
sale is the relevant one. Also we could assume that the applicable interest rate for the whole 
holding period is the one announced by the IRS for that year. A simple alternative would be for 
the IRS to average the interest rates for each holding period. Indeed, the IRS could apply the 
relevant interest rate to each year in the holding period. Whichever interest rate is chosen, the 
total liability including the gain and the interest charges would depend on the gain and the 
holding period. If a “ratable” even gain is implemented, the IRS could annually publish a table 
showing the percent increase in the gain attributable to the interest charges for any given holding 
period. The taxpayer would then apply this percentage to the nominal gain and enter the 
combined amount in taxable income. If the system assumes an equal rate of return over the 
holding period, it would have to be a two dimensional table showing the percent increase in tax 
liabilities depending on both the holding period and the percent gain relative to the original basis. 
F. Incentives to Defer Sales Compared to Current Law 
  Although the proposed scheme is not perfectly Vickrey-Auerbach neutral, the key factor 
in determining its viability in terms of revenue is whether it creates less of an incentive to defer 
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realizing capital gains than exists under current law. At the same tax rate, the interest charge will 
always reduce the incentive to defer. But the incentive to defer transactions increases with the tax 
rate, and the proposal contemplates a large increase in the tax rate on dividends and capital gains 
compared to current law. 
  Under the proposal, the interest rate would be chosen to assure that the incentive to defer 
realizing capital gains would be no larger than current law. In order to see where the interest rate 
might lie, we first simulated the incentive to defer realizations under the Vickrey-Auerbach 
specifications. The interest rate used is the expected risk-free return. The theory specifies the 
after-tax interest rate because that is what investors will earn if they sell and reinvest the 
proceeds. We ran simulations with both the after-tax interest rate and the pre-tax interest rate.  
  We considered a case in which the tax rates on dividends and capital gains changes from 
23.8 percent, the top rate on capital gains and dividends under current law, to 43.4 percent, the 
top rate on ordinary income under current law. The expected annual (risk-free) increase in the 
value of the asset is assumed to be 5 percent (after any corporate tax), which is also the level of 
the interest charge. We also take the least favorable case of a large capital gain at the beginning 
of the holding period. As Auerbach (1991) notes, the assumption of an even gain over the 
holding period always creates an incentive to defer realization of a large early gain compared to 
Vickrey-Auerbach neutrality. However, our simulations indicate that this benefit of deferring 
realizations generally tends to be lower than under current law even with the large assumed 
difference in tax rates.  
 We assume a gain G in the first year and no gain in any subsequent year. After n years 
the gain attributed to each of the n years is G/n under the simplifying assumption of a “ratable” 
or even gain. If the tax rate on ordinary income is t, the potential tax liability after n years is 
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. The taxpayer could sell the 
asset now, incur this liability, and reinvest the net proceeds expecting to earn r. Alternatively, 
s/he could defer selling, expecting to earn r on the pre-tax value G, and liquidate after the next 
period. The tax liability is found by substituting  for n in the above expression. In addition, 
the taxpayer would expect to pay tax equal to  on the additional year’s expected earnings. 
The net difference in the wealth under the two strategies represents the benefits of deferring 
the sale. This can be compared with the benefit of deferring the transaction under current law 
with preferential tax rate T, namely . 
 This comparison between the benefits of deferring tax under current law and under the 
interest charge proposal can be illustrated in a simple example. Suppose a taxpayer earns a 
capital gain in the first period and is deciding whether to realize the gain or defer selling for one 
more period. Under current law, realizing the gain G at the end of the first period and reinvesting 
the proceeds would result in  at the end of the second period. If 
realization is deferred to the end of the second period and the taxpayer expects the asset to 
increase in value by the same 5 percent, end of second period wealth would be 
. The gain from deferring the sale is . Under the proposal with a 
tax rate of 43.4 percent, liquidating after the first period and reinvesting the proceeds would 
result in  at the end of the second period. If the taxpayer chooses to 
defer selling, the proceeds before the interest charge would be . But in 
addition the interest charge on the gain has to be paid. The gain is assumed to accrue evenly over 
the two periods. No interest is due for the second period gain. Therefore the additional tax that 
has to be paid is . The difference between the two strategies in terms of 
 t(G / n)[1+ (1+ r)+ (1+ r)
2 + ...+ (1+ r)n-1]= t(G / n)[(1+ r)n -1] / r
 n+1
 trG
 n+1
 G(1+ r)(1-T )-G(1-T )[1+ r(1-T )]
 0.762G ´ (1+0.762´0.05)
 G(1+0.05)(0.762)  0.009068G
 0.566G(1+0.566´0.05)
 G(1+0.05)(0.566)
 (G / 2)´0.434´0.05
36 
 
period two wealth is , or less than 20 percent of the benefit of deferring under current 
law.  
 Even if the interest charged reflects the after-personal-tax risk-free rate, as is indicated by 
Vickrey and Auerbach, the benefit of deferring realization in the first period is , still 
substantially less than the  benefit under current law. This indicates that charging 
interest rates consistent with Vickrey-Auerbach optimality achieves the goal of reducing the 
incentive to defer realization below current law even though the tax rate is much higher. 
 The series is slightly more complicated if an equal annual rate of return is assumed. The 
annual return becomes , assuming continuous compounding. The most distant 
year in the holding period is assumed to earn B A where B is the original basis. The tax liability 
for that year is therefore . The next year’s liability is , 
where the annual return is now higher because it compounds the first period gain. 
 We can illustrate the difference between the operation of an equal annual rate of return 
assumption and an even absolute gain using the same two-period example above. The taxpayer 
has a 20 percent gain in the first period and no further gains thereafter. All of the other 
assumptions are the same as above. Thus, the taxpayer's end of first period wealth is 1.2 B. 
Under current law, the expected benefit of deferring realization is , the same 
as earlier. Under the proposal, the expected wealth from selling after the first period and 
reinvesting the proceeds is , again the same as before. The only 
change in the benefit from deferring realization is that the annual gain  is replaced by 
, the annual rate of return that compounds to a 20 percent return after two years. That is, 
the additional tax that has to be paid is . Substituting for , we 
 0.001432G
 0.006141G
 0.009068G
 log(1+G) / n = A
´
 tB´ A´ (1+ r)
n-1
 tB´ A´ (1+ A)´ (1+ r)
n-2
´
 0.009068´0.2´ B
 0.566´0.2´ B(1+0.566´0.05)
 G / 2
 0.0955
 0.0955B´0.434´0.05  G = 0.2B
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can see that the benefit of deferring under the interest charge proposal is now , 
somewhat higher than before but still much lower than the benefit under current law. 
 A similar comparison of incentives would apply to dividend payout decisions. Companies 
would presumably respond to the preferences of shareholders. A given amount of after-
corporate-tax earnings E in a given year is the equivalent of the gain G above. It can be retained, 
increasing the value of the company by E, or paid out as a taxable dividend to the shareholder. 
After paying the personal level tax, the taxpayer reinvests the net proceeds and expects to earn a 
before-personal-level tax of r. Conversely, if the company retains E it can defer the shareholder’s 
level tax. It expects to earn an after corporate tax return of r on E. The taxpayer sells the shares 
after the second period and pays the capital gains rate. The two strategies are compared as above 
to evaluate the benefits of deferring the payout of the dividend. The difference between current 
law and the proposal is the much higher personal tax rates on dividends and capital gains and the 
interest charge on the deferred gain under the proposal. The analysis is parallel to the capital 
gains realization decision.  
G. Incentives for Income Shifting 
 The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35 percent will greatly reduce the benefits of 
income shifting. The 15 percent rate would also limit the gains from inversion or expatriation, 
such as opportunities to strip interest and to move present and future foreign income out of the 
U.S. tax net. An offsetting factor is any increase in the tax on foreign income in the form of a 
minimum tax on foreign income. However the revenue cost of an overall minimum tax would be 
relatively modest. Grubert and Altshuler (2013) reported that an overall 15 percent minimum tax 
would, on a static basis, amount to a 2 percentage point tax on total foreign income, less than the 
companies would gain from being able to repatriate tax free. 
 0.00192G
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H. The Tax Treatment of Foreign Income  
 Lowering the U.S. corporate tax rate to 15 percent will have a very significant effect on 
reducing base erosion. The question is how active foreign income earned by U.S. MNCs should 
be treated. The basic alternatives are simple dividend exemption, dividend exemption with 
expense allocations to exempt income, a per country minimum tax at 15 percent, and an overall 
foreign minimum tax at 15 percent. In each case, passive income, interest, and royalties received 
would be fully taxed at 15 percent. The overall minimum tax is much simpler than the per-
country minimum because it avoids all the complications of assigning a component of foreign 
income to its tax residence. (As explained in Grubert and Altshuler (2013), taxing the income on 
the basis of where the CFC is incorporated is easily avoided by the various ways companies can 
separate the tax residence of income from the place of incorporation.) Furthermore, the overall 
minimum tax shares many of the advantages of the per country system. Grubert and Altshuler 
(2013) found that under a 15 percent overall minimum tax, companies that account for two-thirds 
of MNC foreign income would be subject to a marginal tax rate of 15 percent. The reaction of 
those companies would be similar to their reaction to a per-country minimum tax. The remaining 
third would have enough excess foreign tax credits to shield additional low tax income. 
I. Revenue  
 Is a 15 percent corporate tax rate feasible? The revenue considerations here are not 
intended to yield precise revenue estimates, but to indicate that a 15 percent rate is not an 
unrealistic goal. The rough estimates at 2012 levels we refer to below are for the longer run after 
full behavioral responses. 
 In 2012, corporate tax revenues amounted to $320 billion. We contemplate some modest 
base broadening so the tax base to which the 15 percent rate applies would be somewhat larger. 
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If we assume a modest 10 percent increase in the tax base, which would finance a reduction of 
the tax rate from 35 to about 31.8 percent, revenue neutrality with a reduction of the corporate 
rate to 15 percent requires about $170 billion at 2012 levels. We use 2012 because the 
breakdown of the revenue from various components of income is available for that year. The 
maximum tax rate on capital gains and dividends has risen since then and we use the current 
approximately 20 percentage point differential compared to ordinary income in the estimates 
below. The offsets to the loss in corporate level revenues include the following. 
1. Revenues from the Much Higher Tax Rate on Capital Gains and Dividends in 
Addition to the Interest Charges  
Because of the interest charge, we assume conservatively that the holding periods are the 
same as under current law. The taxes paid on gains eligible for the long-term tax rate averaged 
$70.1 billion per year from 2003 to 2012. The maximum long-term tax rate was 15 percent over 
this period.
12
 This 10-year period covered both strong and weak stock markets. Taxing these 
gains at ordinary rates would raise about an additional $90 billion.
13
 In addition, rough 
calculations based on 2009 holding periods suggest that interest charges will increase taxes paid 
by about 20 percent.
14
 
 Revenue derived from qualified dividends amounted to $26.4 billion in 2012. The 
average marginal effective tax rate on these dividends was 14.1 percent. The average marginal 
tax rate on non-qualified dividends was 24.3 percent. If the 10-percentage point differential 
between qualified dividends and non-qualified dividends persists at the new higher rates and 
                                                 
12
 From 2003 to 2009, these computations included the impact of the phase-outs of itemized deductions. 
13
 The top marginal rate on capital gains and dividends is now 23.8 percent, including the 3.8 percent on net 
investment income. Actual collections are only available through 2012 but it might be appropriate to net the 
estimated gain from the new higher rate.  
14
 The latest year for which holding periods are available is 2009. We assumed an interest charge of 5 percent. 
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qualified dividends were just taxed at the non-qualified rate, it would mean an additional $20 
billion of tax revenue.  
2. Revenues from Interest Charges from the Deemed Realization at Death or When 
Appreciated Property is Transferred to Another Individual 
A similar proposal, without the interest charge, was in the Administration’s fiscal 2016 
budget (Office of Management and Budget, 2015). The estimated gain in FY 2018 assuming a 
top capital gains rate of 24.2 percent was $17.5 billion. (The estimates for 2019 and 2020 were 
$15.0 and $13.9 billion, respectively.) At a top ordinary tax rate of 43.4 percent and interest 
charges for the imputed yearly gains, the annual revenue gain would be a least $25 billion at 
2012 levels. (The budget proposal provided for a $100,000 exclusion that could roll over to a 
surviving spouse, as well as exemptions and extended payments for small business.) 
3. Revenues from the Reduction in Income Shifting from the United States  
Grubert (2012) estimated that 12 percent of U.S. MNCs’ worldwide income in 2004 had 
been shifted abroad as a result of the differential between the U.S. corporate tax and the average 
effective tax rate of 15 percent on U.S. MNC income abroad. The tax differential is probably 
greater now. Furthermore, Hodge (2011) found that the foreign share of national profits 
increased from 26.3 percent in 2004 to 38.2 percent in 2009. Even if moving to a 15 percent U.S. 
corporate tax rate reduced income shifting by only one half, that would increase the U.S. 
corporate tax base by about 7 percentage points. If this is taxed at 15 percent, the gain would be 
about $10 billion per year. Not included in this rough estimate is the reduced income shifting by 
foreign controlled corporations in the United States. 
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 The revenues from these items total about $165 billion, which is very close to our $170 
billion target. The following items, for which we do not attempt even rough estimates, should 
result in a revenue gain beyond the amount needed.  
4. Increased Investment in the United States.  
Lowering the corporate tax rate to 15 percent would increase investment in the United 
States by both foreign and domestic investors. U.S. portfolio investors would find domestic 
stocks relatively more attractive compared to foreign shares. The personal level tax would rise on 
both equally. The lower corporate level effective tax rate would attract both more portfolio and 
direct investment from abroad. Finally, the lower corporate rate may cause U.S. MNCs to 
allocate a greater share of their worldwide investment to the United States. The increased 
corporate capital in the United States would not only increase corporate level revenues, but 
would also increase revenues from U.S. domestic labor that becomes more productive with a 
larger capital stock.  
5. The Taxation of Foreign Income.  
A per country minimum tax at 15 percent would raise substantial revenue. It would also 
eliminate any incentives for companies based in the United States to shift income. However, it 
would offset some of the positive effect of the 15 percent domestic tax in reducing expatriations 
and shifting. The Administration’s Fiscal Year 2016 budget, in the Reserve for Business Tax 
Reform, contained a proposal for a 19 percent per country minimum tax. It was estimated to raise 
about $20 billion per year. A 15 percent minimum tax would raise a disproportionately lower 
amount because of the credits for foreign tax, perhaps $10 billion per year. (This does not double 
count the reduction in income shifting referred to above.) 
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 A 15 percent overall minimum tax on foreign income would raise much less and would 
be close to being revenue neutral. Grubert and Altshuler (2013) report that the estimated static 
gain from the 15 percent overall minimum tax would equal the gain from a 10 percent per 
country tax. 
6. One-Time Gain in Stock Prices 
These revenue considerations do not include the one-time gain in stock prices resulting 
from the large reduction in the corporate tax rate. Also, we assume that foreign income would be 
taxed under some type of dividend exemption system. We do not here include the one-time tax 
on earnings retained abroad by U.S. corporations prior to the effective date. 
7. Increasing Progressivity of the Personal Tax 
Finally, in the unlikely possibility that there is still a revenue gap, one possibility for 
raising further revenue is to increase the progressivity of the personal tax. The Administration's 
Fiscal Year 2016 budget proposed to limit the value of various personal deductions to 28 percent, 
which would increase taxable income in the higher brackets. The increase in revenue over the 
10-year budget window was estimated to be in excess of $50 billion per year.  
 This discussion of revenue sources implicitly refers to the long run. However, any 
revenue gain in the short run is not likely to be large and may be more than offset in the short run 
by increased realizations before the effective date. These realizations would of course reduce the 
present value of revenues, but would smooth out any short run shortfall. Our proposed transition 
rule for holding periods that started before the effective date is to compute annual gains over the 
whole holding period, the normal rule, but only impose the interest charge and higher tax rate on 
the imputed gains after the effective date. The same rule would apply to the deemed realization 
at death. 
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 Because of the interest charge after the effective date, the objective of keeping the 
incentive to defer realizations no larger than under current law, even at the much higher tax rate, 
would be satisfied. The only difference from the long run revenue estimate is the lower tax rate 
and absence of interest charges for the period before the effective date. Conversely, shareholders 
that had assets with very large gains before the effective date would have an incentive to sell 
before the effective date to avoid having some of their large gains being imputed to the period 
after the effective date with its interest charges and high tax rates. Moreover, taxpayers who had 
planned to liquidate their holdings shortly after the effective date would obviously accelerate 
their realizations. These accelerated realizations before the effective date may make up for any 
short run loss because of lower interest charges.
15
 
 Summing up, replacing the corporate level revenue loss from lowering the corporate tax 
rate to 15 percent seems within reach. Compared to the mark-to-market proposal, our proposal 
picks up more revenue in present value from dividends and capital gains because gains from 
non-traded assets are taxed at ordinary rates and corporate revenue is only cut by about half. 
J. Distributional Effects 
  In assessing the distributional impact of the interest charge proposal, it is useful to 
consider the effect of the remaining 15 percent of the corporate tax separately from the share of 
the tax on corporate income that is shifted to the personal level. The incidence of the remaining 
15 percent corporate tax will fall on domestic capital owners to a greater extent than the current 
corporate tax. One of the ways that the corporate tax falls on labor is through portfolio and direct 
capital flows abroad to escape the tax. However, under the interest charge proposal, any flow of 
U.S. owned capital to lower tax locations will in part be offset by the current (in present value) 
                                                 
15
 Toder and Viard (2014) would spread the pre-effective date gain over a 10-year period and charge the pre-
effective date low tax rate. 
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taxation at the personal level of the increase in stock prices resulting from the lower tax burden 
abroad.  
 More importantly, several factors cause the shift in the taxation of corporate income to 
the personal level to have an incidence more progressive than the corporate level taxation that it 
replaces. For example, the increase in tax on capital gains and dividends applies to resident 
holdings of both foreign and domestic shares, and cannot be avoided by shifting to foreign 
stocks. 
 Furthermore, the increase in tax is exclusively on domestic taxpayers. The increased tax 
on the corporate income earned by U.S. individual taxpayers has no effect on foreign investors, 
who get a tax cut and will increase portfolio and direct investment. The pre-tax rate of return 
earned by resident investors in the corporate sector will decline. (In part this will be a revenue 
transfer to foreign investors, but it is also in part a transfer to domestic labor.) If the optimal tax 
on foreign investment is substantially below current levels, the latter effect will dominate. For 
example, if the supply of foreign capital is perfectly elastic, the standard result is that the optimal 
tax on foreign capital is zero. If the initial tax on foreign capital is lowered to zero, capital flows 
in, but foreign investors get the same after-tax return as they did previously. Domestic investors 
may lose, and domestic labor gets the entire benefit of the inflow including any loss suffered by 
domestic capital.  
 The different losers and gainers in the shift in tax from the corporate level to the personal 
level also suggest an increase in progressivity. For example, pension funds gain from the lower 
corporate tax rate, and pension income is more equally distributed than individual capital gains 
and dividends. The beneficiaries of charitable and educational institutions that benefit from the 
corporate rate cut are also likely to be lower and middle income households. 
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 Also, even within the group of taxable individuals, the shift of the uniform incidence of 
the corporate tax on all shareholders irrespective of income to the progressive tax schedule for 
capital gains and dividends will have a similar progressive distributional effect. 
 The evidence and existing distributional analysis by U.S. Treasury and others support a 
progressive effect for the reform (Altshuler, Harris, and Toder, 2010). In 2012, 73 percent of the 
revenue from long-term capital gains was earned by taxpayers with Adjusted Gross Income 
greater the $1.0 million, 82 percent with AGI above $500,000, and 93 percent with AGI above 
$200,000. Similarly, 52 percent of qualified dividends were received by taxpayers with AGI 
above $1 million.  
  The U.S. Treasury distribution model for 2016 income levels and law finds that 72.5 
percent of the burden of the corporate income tax is borne by the top decile. In contrast, 90.7 
percent of the tax on qualified dividends and positive long-term capital gains is borne by the top 
decile. This pattern is even more notable in the top 1 percent, which is estimated to bear 49 
percent of the corporate income tax but 73.7 percent of the taxes paid on qualified dividends and 
positive long-term capital gains.
16
  
 The proposal in the Administration's  Fiscal Year 2016 budget to tax capital gains at 
death is even more skewed to the top of the income distribution. The U.S. Treasury estimates 
that more than 80 percent of the tax would be paid by the top 0.1 percent — those with income 
greater than $2 million.
17
  
K. Comparison of Interest Charge Proposal with 15 Percent Per Country Minimum 
Tax on Foreign Income 
                                                 
16
 See Cronin et al. (2013) for a detailed description of the U.S. Treasury distributional model.  
17
 This estimate includes the impact of a proposal to raise the maximum capital gains rate to 24.2 percent, but more 
than 85 percent of the revenue was accounted for by taxation of gains at death. The proposal has a $100,000 per 
person exclusion which can roll over to the surviving spouse. Furthermore, the tax is not triggered until the death of 
the second spouse. 
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 Recently we analyzed a per country minimum tax for foreign income (Grubert and 
Altshuler, 2013). To discourage income shifting from the United States and the resulting 
distortion of investment, the excess returns in each foreign jurisdiction would be subject to a 15 
percent minimum tax net of any local taxes paid. Taxes paid are matched with the tax residence 
of the income, not necessarily the country in which the subsidiary is incorporated. For example, 
the income of a CFC incorporated in Ireland with a tax residence in Bermuda under the Irish 
place of management rules would be assigned to Bermuda. Furthermore, in order to tax only 
excess returns abroad, investment in tangible assets could be deducted from the minimum tax 
base.
18
 
 Apart from greater simplicity, the interest charge proposal differs from the per country 
minimum tax in several significant ways. First, an increase in the tax rate for U.S. companies in a 
low tax country represents an increase relative to both the United States and relative to higher tax 
foreign countries, those with corporate rates above 15 percent. Income and investment will shift 
both back to the United States and to other foreign countries. Under the interest charge proposal 
with its 15 percent corporate tax rate, the U.S. tax rate falls relative to all foreign countries, both 
high tax and low tax. 
 Probably more important is the contrasting impact of the two proposals on the incentives 
for U.S. companies to expatriate. The minimum tax constitutes a significant increase in the tax 
on U.S. MNCs, offset only in part by being paired with tax-free dividend repatriations. It creates 
an incentive for U.S. companies to expatriate to avoid the minimum tax. In contrast, lowering the 
U.S. corporate tax rate to 15 percent under the interest charge proposal erodes many of the 
                                                 
18
 This is similar to the notional allowance for company assets in the Business Enterprise Income Tax (BEIT) 
proposed by Kleinbard (2007). 
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benefits of changing corporate residence. In particular, stripping income out of the United States 
is much less profitable.  
  The substantially lower corporate tax rate in the interest charge proposal also has an 
impact beyond U.S.-based MNCs. Foreign-based companies and foreign portfolio investors will 
have a greater incentive to invest in the United States. U.S. portfolio investors will have less 
reason to invest in foreign securities to escape the high U.S. corporate tax.  
L. The Corporate-Noncorporate Distortion 
 Although international issues and the distributional effects of the proposals are the main 
focus of this paper, the impact on the classic corporate-noncorporate distortion is also of interest. 
Foreign direct and portfolio investors will increase their investment in the U.S. corporate sector 
because their corporate level tax would fall substantially under the interest charge proposal but 
they would not be subject to the increase in taxes at the personal level; they do not generally 
invest in the U.S. noncorporate sector. In a revenue neutral proposal, U.S. resident investors may 
experience an increased combined tax burden on corporate investment. But several factors 
suggest there will be a lower overall net tax burden on the U.S. corporate sector. For example, 
there will be a much higher tax rate on noncorporate capital gains. Also, the personal level tax on 
portfolio investment abroad will increase. In addition, the additional revenue from less income 
shifting and fewer expatriations does not represent an additional tax burden. In fact it indicates a 
net gain to corporations because the saving in shifting costs exceeds the tax they pay on their 
additional U.S. taxable income.  
M. Comparing Halperin’s Proposed Response to the Problem of Lower Corporate 
Rates 
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   Halperin (2009) also addressed the issues raised by a shift in the burden of taxation from 
the personal to the shareholder level. One of his proposals is to deny the lower corporate rate to 
passive and service income to discourage the accumulation of income in the corporation. For 
passive income, this would seem to apply the definition already in the Internal Revenue Code, 
such as in the characterization of Foreign Personal Holding Company Income, to all 
corporations. These rules already deal with issues such as the allocation of expenses like interest 
to passive income. The Active Finance Exception to the subpart F rules could also be used for 
financial institutions. Needless to say these rules are complicated, as would be the definition of 
services. Halperin also proposes to reduce the step-up in basis at death and the deduction for 
charitable contributions by the amount of undistributed earnings. Finally, he suggests that the 
combined corporate and individual rates on corporate distributions should be higher than the top 
individual rate. 
 Our interest charge proposal under which the interest rate is chosen to deter the use of 
corporations to accumulate passive income would seem to be much simpler and more inclusive 
than the Halperin (2009) alternative. Defining passive and service income would be unnecessary. 
Deemed realization including interest charges at death renders the step-up problem moot. The 
interest charge regime also fulfills Halperin’s requirement that the combined corporate and 
individual taxes on corporate distributions be higher than the top marginal rate. In any case, 
taxpayers may find it difficult to determine what share of earnings was retained during their 
holding periods, which would require adopting the per shareholder determination of income rules 
that now apply to Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs). While the specific rules for calculating 
the interest rate must still be determined, it appears feasible to construct an interest rate regime 
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that does not increase the incentive to defer realizing capital gains, reduce dividend payouts, and 
use corporations to accumulate passive income compared to current law.  
N. Final Remarks 
Our interest charge proposal includes full taxation of capital gains and dividends at 
ordinary rates, the deemed realization of gains at death, and an overall or per country 15 percent 
minimum tax on foreign income. Each of these tax parameters could be varied somewhat to 
achieve revenue neutrality. For example, deemed realization at death could have a substantial 
exclusion, as recommended in the administration’s budget proposal. The minimum tax on 
foreign income could be lower than 15 percent and the tax on capital gains could have a modest 
preferential feature. More important, the proposal could include a lowering of the individual tax 
rate schedule through significant base broadening on the personal side of the income tax. That 
would reduce the required increase in the tax on capital gains and dividends while preserving 
revenue neutrality. For example, the Simplified Income Tax Plan option in the 2005 Report of 
the President's Advisory Panel for Federal Tax Reform (President's Advisory Panel, 2005) 
projected a top individual tax rate of 33 percent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 Our examination of the three alternative methods for shifting the tax burden on corporate 
income from the corporate level to the personal level indicates that our plan, which lowers the 
corporate rate to 15 percent, taxes capital gains and dividends as ordinary income, and imposes 
an interest charge on the tax deferred over the holding period, is highly effective in reducing the 
benefits of income shifting and expatriation while avoiding some of the major weaknesses of the 
other options. The proposal can be implemented rather simply and could include a lowering 
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of the individual tax rate schedule through significant base broadening on the personal side 
of the income tax. 
 The mark-to-market proposal that eliminates the corporate tax entirely is highly effective 
in reducing income shifting and inversions. However it creates a large tax differential between 
the tax on publicly traded versus non-publicly traded financial assets, as the latter retain deferral 
of capital gains and also enjoy the current law low rates when gains are realized. This feature 
will greatly distort firm decisions regarding whether to be publicly traded, including decisions 
such as whether a company should engage in an IPO. Line drawing defining what is publicly 
traded will be complicated. The elimination of the corporate tax makes it difficult to satisfy 
revenue neutrality.
19
  
 The integration proposals that either limit shareholder credits to U.S. taxes paid, as in the 
Australian model, or convert the corporate tax into a withholding tax, as in the ALI plan, have to 
confront the fact that less than half of U.S. corporate income is owned in currently taxable 
personal accounts. Thus a large pool of owners will continue to be able to enjoy the benefits of 
inversions and shifting. In addition, half of U.S. MNCs currently pay enough U.S. tax to be able 
to give shareholders full credits, and can thus continue to shift income to low-tax locations. 
Furthermore, even the companies without enough potential credits and their shareholders can 
respond to weaken the intent of the proposal. For example, companies can reduce their 
dividends, letting shareholders eventually obtain their returns in the form of lightly taxed capital 
gains. There could also be major clientele effects in which companies without enough credits are 
held in exempt accounts. Companies with low payout rates would continue to be inversion 
candidates. 
                                                 
19
 Toder and Viard (2016) have revised their proposal to include a 15 percent corporate tax, shareholder integration, 
and a tax on interest received by pension funds and tax exempts. Shareholder integration brings problems of its own. 
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 To be sure, numerous design issues must still be resolved under our proposal. The 
determination of the interest rate is one example. However it appears that a straightforward 
approach can be developed that achieves the objective of preventing large behavioral responses 
such as an increase in deferred realizations. 
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